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NOTE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM "DOLLAR
FOR VOTES" - THE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
INTRODUCTION
Campaign finance reform has become a pervasive element
of our political discourse. There have been constant allega-
tions of abuse of the existing financing regulations. Indi-
viduals and groups are frequently using contributions to
purchase access and influence to legislative channels.
These contributions have led to a virtual replacement of our
representative system of government by a dictatorship of
the "moneyed elite." This Note begins with a brief history
of campaign finance regulations. Part two discusses the
need for changing the existing system. Part three examines
the various reform proposals suggested to bring about
needed change. Part four recommends a course of action.
I. HISTORY
Money and politics have had a long and sordid history.
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Congress began its effort to control monetary influence in
politics in 1907, with the passage of the Tillman Act (the
Act).' This Act prohibited chartered banks and corporations
from making contributions to political campaigns. 2 In 1925,
Congress passed the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,3 which
focused on general election activities. It required candi-
dates and political action committees ("PACs") to disclose
contributions and expenditures. 4 Further legislative efforts
at reform stagnated, until the 1970s when the ties between
money and politics were notoriously exposed during the
Watergate scandal.5 The investigation that led to the expo-
sure of Watergate also showed that many corporations had
bought government favors through campaign contributions,
despite the prohibition against such practices since 1907.6
There were also instances of wealthy individuals buying
1 See Tillman Act, Act of January 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1998)); Bruce D. Brown, Alien Donors: The Participation of Non-
Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503, 524-25
(1997) (stating that Tillman Act was Congress's first attempt at regulating money in elec-
tions); see also Debra Burke, Twenty Years After the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974: Look Who's Running Now, 99 DICK. L. REV. 357, 358 (1994) (de-
scribing history of Tillman Act); Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Fi-
nancing Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 60-61
(1987) (stating that Tillman Act was passed to "minimize the influence of large corporate
contributions").
2 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (indicating that "[ilt is unlawful for any ... bank, or... cor-
poration ... to contribut[e] ... to any political office"); Brown, supra note 1, at 525 (lim-
iting political contributions); Burke, supra note 1, at 358 (stating corporations prohibited
from making campaign contributions); see also Nahra, supra note 1, at 60-61 (indicating
Act prevented corporate campaign contributions).
3 Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 2 U.S.C. § 256 (repealed 1972); see also Bur-
roughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934) (opining that Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act prevents corruption through political contribution).
4 See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. at 41-42 (describing how Act functions);
Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens' Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amend-
ment, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 21-22 (1997) (describing history and development of Act); Burke,
supra note 1, at 358 (explaining extent of Act); see also Gary S. Stein, The First Amend-
ment and Campaign Finance Reform: A Timely Reconciliation, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 743,
744 (1992) (describing disclosure required by Act). See generally Nahra, supra note 1, at
62-63 (discussing loopholes in disclosure provisions of Act).
5 See Donald J. Simon, Beyond Post-Watergate Reform: Putting an End to the Soft
Money System, 24 J. LEGIS. 167, 167 (1998) (describing depth of corruption during Water-
gate era); David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Can-
didate Contributions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 39 (1998) (illus-
trating evils of fundraising during Watergate period); see also Joseph Lieberman, The
Politics of Money and the Road to Self-Destruction, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 425, 432-33
(1998) (describing Watergate as circumstantial paradigm for campaign finance reform).
6 See Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 USC §
441b (1994) (banning corporate donations); Simon, supra note 5, at 167 (noting that solic-
ited corporate donors yielded approximately $749,000 to Nixon campaign, including dona-
tions from American Airlines, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Gulf Oil, and Hertz).
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ambassadorships with huge contributions. 7 These abuses,
when added to governmental favoritism toward corporate
contributors, led to widespread calls for reform. 8
In 1974, Congress responded by amending the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971.9 The Act of 1971 did sev-
eral things, namely: (1) repealed the Corrupt Practices Act;
(2) required the disclosure of contributions exceeding $1,000
by political committees; (3) required the disclosure of con-
tributions by individuals in excess of $100; (4) limited ex-
penditures for use in the communications media; and (5)
limited contributions and expenditures from a candidate's
personal funds.O However, the Act had various deficiencies
that rendered it ineffective. 1 ' Although it repealed prohibi-
tions on contributions,12 the expenditure limits applied only
7 See Simon, supra note 5, at 167-68 (recognizing that Walter H. Annenberg, Ambas-
sador to Great Britain contributed $254,000; Shelby Davis, Ambassador to Switzerland
contributed $100,000; and Arthur K Watson, Ambassador to France contributed
$303,000); The Final Report of the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activi-
ties, S. REP. No. 93-981, at 493 (1974) (detailing Senate Committee's findings); see also
Ian Ayres, Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity To Disrupt
the Market For Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 858 (1998) (stating that man-
dated anonymity would eliminate longstanding practice of rewarding fundraisers with
ambassadorships). See generally Ronald A. Cass, Money Power and Politics: Governance
Models and Campaign Finance Regulation, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 40-41 (1998) (recog-
nizing that ambassadorships have historically been rewards for campaign fundraising).
8 See Simon, supra note 5, at 168 (describing $2 million campaign contribution by As-
sociated Milk Producers which was linked to governmental support of increases in federal
milk price supports, and $400,000 campaign contribution by ITT which was linked to fa-
vorable antitrust ruling); see also Stanley I. Kutler, In the Shadow of Watergate: Legal,
Political, and Cultural Implications, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1743, 1748-49 (1994) (discussing
public demands for reform).
9 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1988) (codi-
fied in 2 U.S.C. f 431 et seq.). See Burke, supra note 1, at 359 (stating that plethora of
campaign finance reform began with passage of FECA); Nahra, supra note 1, at 65 (noting
Watergate repercussions compelled Congress to pass Federal Election Campaign Act in
1971). See generally Financing Campaigns: Growing Pressure for Reform, 31 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 1877 (1973).
10 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1988)
(amending Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971); Smith, supra note 4, at 23-25 (listing
FECA's components); Burke, supra note 1, at 359 (stating components of Act); see also
Nahra, supra note 1, at 64 (detailing FECA's restrictions).
11 See Burke, supra note 1, at 359 (discussing problems with FECA); see also Lisa
Gordon, Note, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission: A Court Divided-One Opinion Properly Subjects Campaign Finance Juris-
prudence to a Reality C heck, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1565, 1569 (1997) (stating that 1971
FECA had enormous deficiencies).
12 See Burke, supra note 1, at 359 (creating "pattern of dependence from wealthy in-
dividuals and special interest groups"); Nahra, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that FECA re-
pealed existing contribution limits); see also Robert 0. Tiernan, The Presidential Cam-
paign: Public Financing Accepted, 69 NATIONAL CMc REV. 133, 135 (1980) (indicating
small percent of individuals provide most of campaign financing).
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to the media.13 The Act also failed to establish an adminis-
trative body to implement and enforce the law.14
The weaknesses of the Act of 1971 led to continued abuses
of the system which were exposed during Watergate.15 Con-
gress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
("FECA") to remedy the flaws in the Act of 1971 and the
political system in general.16 It initiated four basic reforms:
(1) public financing, (2) disclosure, (3) limits on campaign
contributions, and (4) limits on campaign expenditures.17
FECA provided for the full public funding of presidential
elections, the partial funding of presidential primaries, and
the funding of national party nominating conventions.18 It
also allowed public funding of up to two million dollars for
national party nominating conventions, and matching pub-
lic funds in presidential primaries of up to $5 million per
candidate.19 These funds were only available to candidates
13 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431) (stating limits on campaign expenditures); Burke, supra
note 1, at 359 (allowing expansion of campaign budgets in all areas except media); see also
Nahra, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that FECA placed ceilings on candidates'media expen-
ditures).
14 See Burke, supra note 1, at 359 (compelling compliance was difficult with lack of
administrative structure); see also PAUL S. HERNSON, THE HIGH FINANCE OF AMERICAN
POLITICS: CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND REFORM IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS, IN CAMPAIGN AND
PARTY FINANCE IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 17, 19 (Arthur B. Bunlicks ed.,
1993) (discussing inherent weaknesses of Act).
15 See David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Re-
quired to Sustain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REV. LITIG. 85, 91-92 (1999) (dis-
cussing abuses of Nixon's fundraising organization- "Committee for the Reelection of the
President").
16 See Pub. L. No. 99-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 USC §431-456
(1994)). Smith, supra-note 4, at 24-25 (discussing 1974 regulatory scheme); Nahra, supra
note 1, at 53-54 (stating that FECA Amendments of 1974 were regulatory scheme de-
signed to correct flaws in campaign finance system); see also David M. Ifshin & Roger E.
Warin, Litigating the 1980 Presidential Election, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 485, 530 (1982) (stat-
ing that FECA Amendments were compelled by campaign finance abuses).
17 See Schultz, supra note 5, at 34 (1998) (stating that limitations placed on campaign
donations); Schultz, supra note 15, at 93 (detailing reforms of 1974 Amendments); Smith,
supra note 4, at 25-26 (discussing 1974 changes); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 507-8 (1995) (detailing new reforms); J. Skelly Wright, Money and
the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 609, 610 (1982) (stating that 1974 Act limited contributions and created
federal agency to enforce laws).
18 See 26 U.S.C. § 9001-42 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (stating funding provisions). See
Simon, supra note 5, 168-69 (discussing public financing); see also Richard Briffault, The
Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2083(1984) (stating that FECA provided public funding to presidential elections to "free the
major party nominees from the need to solicit wealthy donors").
19 See FECA of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 431-455 (1988) (denoting financial contribution lim-
its); Burke, supra note 1, at 363 (stating fiscal limits of public funding).
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who met a fundraising requirement of $100,000.20 This
money had to have been raised in amounts of at least
$5,000 in twenty states, through contributions of $250 or
less. 21 Campaign contributions were limited to $1,000 per
person, per candidate, and $5,000 per political action com-
mittee. 22
FECA also established various expenditure limits: (1) in-
dividual expenditures on behalf of a candidate were limited
to $1,000 per year; (2) Presidential and Vice Presidential
candidates could spend a maximum of $50,000 of their own
personal funds, whereas, Senate and House candidates
were limited to $35,000 and $25,000, respectively; (3) a $10
million expenditure limit was imposed on Presidential pri-
maries and a $20 million limit for Presidential elections; (4)
there was a $100,000 expenditure limit imposed on Senate
primaries, a $150,000 limit imposed on Senate general elec-
tions, and a $70,000 limit on House primaries and general
elections. 23 To ensure compliance with these requirements
Congress created the Federal Election Commission
("FEC"),24 a regulatory body to oversee the implementation
of funding restrictions. This filled the regulatory gap cre-
20 See Burke, supra note 1, at 363; see also Ifshin & Warin, supra note 16, at 493
(stating that candidates must raise at least $100,000).
21 See FECA of 1974, 2 U.S. § 431-455 (1988) (stating limitations of funding for cam-
paigns); Burke, supra note 1, at 363 (denoting limits placed on public contributions to
campaigns for political office); see also Ifshin & Warin, supra note 16, at 493 (indicating
that candidates for political office must raise minimum amount of money for their cam-
paign).
22 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27-38 (discussing
contribution caps); Simon, supra note 5, at 175 (referring to limitations placed on finan-
cial contributions); Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance, the Parties and the Court: A
Comment on Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 91, 119 (1997) (discussing contribution restrictions
under FECA); see also Laurence Michael Bogart, Buckley v. Valeo and Campaign Finance
Reform After California Proposition 73: Why Don't You Love Me Like You Used To Do?, 29
IDAHO L. REV. 235, 244-45 (1993) (detailing limits on contributions from PACs and indi-
viduals).
23 See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumption and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1050 (1996) (stating that 1974 Amendments were
great victories for reformers); Burke, supra note 1, at 363 (summarizing Act's expenditure
limits).
24 See John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Appointment Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 98 (1998)
(discussing creation of FEC); see also Federal Election Commission 10 Year Review (Apr
1985) (stating that FEC oversees federal elections by performing major functions of ad-
ministering public funding, disclosing campaign information, encouraging and monitoring
compliance with law); Wright, supra note 17, at 610 (1982) (discussing creation of FEC).
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ated by previous campaign financing legislation. 25
A. Buckley Dichotomy
Despite its seemingly positive impact on campaign reform,
FECA's regulations were challenged in the basis of free speech 26
in the seminal case Buckley v. Valeo.27 The Supreme Court held
that regulations dealing with money in politics can raise First
Amendment concerns; however, all such regulations are not per
se unconstitutional. 28 In all First Amendment cases, the Court
must employ a balancing test.29 The Court must determine the
strength of the First Amendment interest in the form of speech
at issue and balance it against the strength of the governmental
interest served by the proposed restriction on the speech. 30 To
that end, the Court held that caps on campaign contributions
could serve the compelling government interest of preventing ac-
25 See Kenneth A. Gross & Ki P. Hong, The Criminal and Civil Enforcement of Cam-
paign Finance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 51, 51 (1998) (stating that FEC was cre-
ated to fill need for civil enforcement mechanism); see also Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Expe-
rience, and the First Amendment: the Case of American Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1348, 1348 (1994) (stating that FEC was created as apart of "a virtually new struc-
ture of regulation); Marty Jezer & Ellen Miller, Symposium on Voice in Government-
Money Politics: Campaign Finance and the Subversion of American Democracy, 8 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 467, 486-87 (1994) (noting creation of new agency "to
monitor contributions and expenditures and administer and enforce the law").
26 See Simon, supra note 5, at 171 (stating thatFirst Amendment was implicated by
FECA's regulations); Briffault, supra note 22, at 96 (stating that FECA "impinges on the
core First Amendment concerns of political expression and association"); see also Allison
Rittenhouse Hayward, Stalking the Exclusive Express Advocacy Standard, 10 J.L. & POL.
51, 57 (1993) (stating "the Court established that the First Amendment protects political
expenditure as political speech").
27 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (reviewing constitutionality of campaign contributions and limi-
tations).
28 See Simon, supra note 5, at 171 (discussing constitutionality of public financing
system); see also Schultz, supra note 5, at 35 (1998) (stating that Buckley equated speech
with money); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1281, 1289 (1994) (restricting spending by candidate is not form of speech regula-
tion); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1390, 1395 (1994) (stating all campaign finance laws are not forbidden by First
Amendment).
29 See Schultz, supra note 5, at 47 (illustrating Court's balancing of different inter-
ests); Blasi, supra note 28, at 1286 (describing balancing equality of opportunity with
limiting speech); see also Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating
Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 20-21, 28 (1997) (describing concerns
weighed by Court in Buckley).
30 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976) (demonstrating Court's use of bal-
ancing test); see also Neuborne, supra note 29, at 20 (stating that Supreme Court recog-
nized prevention of "corruption" as compelling interest justifying regulation of campaign
funding, despite inevitable restriction on political autonomy).
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tual corruption, as well as the appearance of corruption, 3 1 the
primary purposes of FECA.32 Thus, Buckley upheld the contri-
bution limits established by FECA.33
However, Buckley created a distinction between contribu-
tions and expenditures, permitting limitations on the for-
mer, but not the latter.34 The Court justified this dichotomy
by explaining that a contribution is a gift of money from one
to another, and that second person spends the money on
speech. 35 Whereas, an expenditure occurs when a person di-
rectly spends money on speech 36, and is therefore too close
to the essence of speech in a modern society. 37 Thus, expen-
ditures are entitled to a higher degree of
protection.38 The Court held that advocating the election
31 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29 (stating purpose of Act is to prevent corruption);
Simon, supra note 5, at 172 (noting corruption prevention as part of Court's balancing
test); Schultz, supra note 5, at 44-45 (1998) (stating Court found primary purpose of pre-
venting corruption as constitutionally sufficient justification); see also Sunstein, supra
note 28, at 1395 (limiting political contributions justifiable attempt to prevent corruption).
32 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (discussing intentions and motivation surrounding pas-
sage of Act); see also Ky Henderson, Ending Pay to Play: What are the Ethics Issues When
Lawyers Contribute to Political Campaigns, 25 HuM. RTS. 20 (1998) (asserting contribu-
tion limits "sought to enhance 'the integrity of our system of representative democracy' by
guarding against corrupt practices"); Schultz, supra note 5, at 40 (discussing report pre-
pared by Committee on House Administration stating that 1974 Amendments were nec-
essary "to place limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures" because candi-
dates were becoming increasingly dependent on special interest groups and large
contributors).
33 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1994); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-38 (stating corruption
as leading factor for contribution limitation); Simon, supra note 5, at 172 (supporting con-
tribution limits).
34 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 58-59 (1976) (stating that only contributions are lim-
ited); Neuborne, supra note 29, at 21 (1997) (stating Court's distinction); see also Burt
Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech. Love and a Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
789, 796-97 (1998) (examining Court's distinction). See generally FEC v. National Conser-
vative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 519-20 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
(stating that three Justices did not clearly support distinction).
35 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 796 (1998) (stating that corruption necessitates
strict campaign funding regulations); Simon, supra note 5, at 171 (describing contribu-
tions); see also Briffault, supra note 22, at 97 (stating that "the transformation of contri-
butions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor");
Briffault, supra note 18, at 2089 (1984) (contrasting contributions and expenditures).
36 See Simon, supra note 5, at 171 (describing expenditures); Briffault, supra note 18,
at 2089 (discussing expenditures).
37 See Briffault, supra note 22, at 96-97 (stating that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voices of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment"); Burke, supra note 1, at 367
(discussing significance of speech in society).
38 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 796 (spending constitutes expression and is ac-
corded First Amendment protection); Briffault supra note 22, at 96 (stating that Buckley
court held that 'money is speech'); see also Daniel Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic:
Campaign Finance and the First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 383(1992) (interpreting Buckley to state that limits in spending are invalid).
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of a political official was entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, in the same way that discussion of political policy is
entitled to protection. 39
This distinction has made campaign finance reform diffi-
cult.40 The difficulty can most easily be described in terms
of an equation.41 Contributions and expenditures are two
sides of a political equation. The Supreme Court limited
contribution caps, but left expenditures unrestricted, cre-
ating an imbalance that is perpetuated during every elec-
tion cycle. 42 This equation has effectively permitted the
translation of economic inequalities into political inequali-
ties.43
B. Soft Money
Campaign financing was further complicated by the ad-
vent of the concept of soft money. Soft money is an um-
brella term that describes contributions to political parties
from sources that are prohibited from making contributions
in connection with federal elections. 44 Soft money became a
39 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48 (stating that First Amendment's broad protec-
tion).
40 See Schultz, supra note 15, at 86 (discussing federal and state court attempts to
deal with finance reform efforts); see also Schultz, supra note 5, at 35 (focusing on link
between money and speech); Briffault, supra note 22, at 126 (stating that Buckley's inter-
nal tensions make doctrine difficult to apply); Joseph Finley, The Pitfalls of Contingent
Public Financing in Congressional Campaign Spending Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 735, 744
(1995) (stating while Buckley found spending limits violate First Amendment, Court did
not disallow voluntary spending limits).
41 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 797 (discussing demand aspects of campaign fi-
nancing equation); see also Peter Dreier, Symposium- America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms,
Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1351, 1400 (1993) (describing American political proc-
ess as an equation).
42 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 797 (discussing inherent weaknesses of unbal-
anced equation); Burt Neuborne, Buckley's Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & POLY 111, 116
(1997) (stating demand for campaign money cannot be limited, but supply has been con-
strained); see also Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Pri-
mary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 294 (1993) (stating that majority of contributions
come from wealthy).
43 See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1413 (discussing conflict between Buckley and Con-
stitutional system); Neuborne, supra note 34, at 797 (discussing inequalities in current
system).
44 See Russell D. Feingold, Representative Democracy Versus Corporate Democracy:
How Soft Money Erodes the Principle of "One Person, One Vote", 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
377, 379 (1998) (defining soft money); Ann McBride, Symposium, Ethics in Congress:
Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 487 (1990) (describing soft money as
campaign contributions raised from sources and in amounts that, if given directly to can-
didates, are illegal in federal elections); see also Investigation of Illegal or Improper Activi-
ties in Connection With the 1996 Federal Election Campaign-Part VIII: Hearings Before
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part of the political fray through an FEC ruling.4 5 The rul-
ing allowed the parties to pay for party-building activities
with money raised pursuant to federal rules (hard money),
and money raised outside the federal rules (soft money).46
The federal rules only apply to money raised for federal
elections. 47 The Commission contended that party-building
activities affect both federal and nonfederal elections, and
thus should be paid for with both kinds of money. 48 Party-
building activities originally included things such as voter
registration drives and "get out the vote" activities. 49 How-
ever, the spectrum of party-building activities has vastly
expanded, serving also to increase the supply of soft
money.5 0 Soft money circumvents existing regulations be-
cause it is not directly linked to any specific candidate. 51
Contributions are made to political parties at the national
level, which then transfer them to state parties. 52 State
parties then serve as conduits to inject the money into the
political stream.53 An example of this process is the contri-
the Senate Comm. On Government Affairs, 105th Cong. 128 (1997) (statements of Prof. An-
thony Corrado describing soft money as "unlimited funds raised by party committees that
cannot be used for the express purpose of influencing Federal elections, but may be used
for a wide array of activities that can indirectly benefit Federal candidates.")
45 See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10.
46 See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10, [1976-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Election Camp.
Fin. Guide (CCH) para. 5340, at 10, 335 (discussing FEC ruling creating hard-soft distinc-
tion); Simon, supra note 5, at 175 (describing creation of soft money loophole); Feingold,
supra note 44, at 380 (1998) (discussing FEC ruling creating soft money loophole); see also
Anthony Corrado, Giving, Spending and "Soft Money'" 6 J.L. & POLy 45, 46-48 (1997)
(discussing 1979 FECA amendments which helped create soft money loophole).
47 See Donald J. Simon, Soft Money: The "End Run" Around Federal Campaign Fi-
nance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 76 (1998) (describing distinction between mon-
ies subject to federal regulations, and money not subject to federal regulations); Corrado,
supra note 46, at 47-48 (describing distinction between federal and nonfederal money).
48 See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10, 1 Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) para. 5340
(Aug. 29, 1978) (discussing pedagogical justifications of creating soft money loophole).
49 See Frances R. Hill, Corporate Philanthropy and Campaign Finance: Exempt Or-
ganizations as Corporate-Candidate Conduits, 4 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 881, 905 (1997) (de-
scribing exemptions provided to party-building activities); Corrado, supra note 46, at 47
(describing exemptions provided to grass roots movements).
50 See Corrado, supra note 46, at 50 (examining newest addition to party-building ac-
tivities--generic party advertising); see also Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (discussing
soft money and advertising).
51 See Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126, 1144 (1994) (contribut-
ing to parties avoids donation restrictions placed on individual candidates).
52 See Corrado, supra note 46, at 48 (showing relaxed state laws often allow corporate
and labor union contributions).
53 See Corrado, supra note 46, at 48-49 (stating that relaxed state laws permit access
to funds prohibited by federal law); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1145 (stating
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butions of Mary C. Bingham in 1990.54 She was a known
supporter of Democratic Senatorial candidate Harvey Slo-
ane. 55 Bingham contributed $250,000 to the Democratic Na-
tional Convention, which then transferred the funds to the
Kentucky Democratic Party.56 The Kentucky state party
spent the money on an advertising campaign created by
Sloane's media consultant, addressing federal issues.57 This
is one of many examples of soft money penetrating the fed-
eral scheme. 58
II. NEED FOR CHANGE
Professor Archibald Cox, former Solicitor General and a
Watergate Special Prosecutor, was once asked whether he
thought the American public would ever see meaningful
campaign finance reform.5 9 He replied, "[W]e can't survive
as a self-governing people if it doesn't happen."60 This
statement prophetically describes the urgent need to reform
the campaign financing system.
A. Growth of soft money
The very basis of the electoral process, the principle of
that unpredictability of states' new role as conduit); see also William March, Doug Stanley
& John Wark, Campaign Money Comes in Crporate-Size Bags, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 11,
1999, at 1 (stating that state parties funnel money into candidates' campaigns).
54 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1147 (illustrating soft money loophole);
Robert L. Garrett, Mary Bingham's $250,000 Gift to Democrats Buoyed, Sloane, COURIER
J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 9, 1990, at 1 (discussing Bingham contribution); Mike Brown,$250,000 Bingham Gift to Democrats Raises Questions About 'Soft Money', COURIER J.(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 10, 1990, at 1 (discussing Bingham contribution).
55 See Garrett, supra note 54, at 1 (discussing political climate surrounding Bingham
contribution); Brown, supra note 54, at 1 (discussing Bingham political loyalty).
56 See Garrett, supra note 54, at 1 (illustrating funneling of money); Brown, supra
note 54, at 1 (showing money transferred from federal party to state party).
57 See Garrett, supra note 54 (stating that money used to benefit federal candidate);
Brown, supra note 54 (showing money used to affect federal election).
58 See Corrado, supra note 46, at 48-49 (providing examples of states filtering money
into federal system); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1145 (describing process of
soft money entering federal system).
59 See John B. Anderson, Campaign Finance: The Impact on the Legislative and Regu-
latory Process, 50 ADM. L. REV. 81, 83 (1998) (citing Cox interview); Conversation with
Archibald Cox, HARVARD L. BULL. at 10 (Summer 1997) (discussing importance of cam-
paign finance reform).
60 See Anderson, supra note 59, at 83. See generally Jim Drinkard, The Ask' Loop-
holes in Campaign Law are Gifts that Keep on Giving, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 1998, at 1A("You couldn't design a system more dangerous to what civics-book democracy is supposed
to be.").
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"one person, one vote" is essentially being eroded by an in-
flux of unregulated political contributions. 6 1 Between 1992
and 1996, there was an explosion in campaign spending. 62
One study estimates that contributions rose 33% during
those four years: from $1.6 billion to $2.2 billion.6 3 The
growth of soft money contributions has also been dramatic:
$9 million in the 1980 presidential elections, $12 million in
1984, $45 million in 1988, $75 million in 1992, and $260
million in 1996.64 As a result, soft money now threatens to
overwhelm the campaign financing system.6 5
The danger of soft money is apparent in its quintessential
quid pro quo relationship. 66 Soft money transactions are
simply a means to barter for access to elected officials and
government decision makers. 67 This is aptly illustrated by
Democratic National Convention ("DNC") fundraiser
Johnny Chung's statement, "I see the
White House is like a subway: You have to put in coins to
open the gates."68
61 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (claiming that electoral process is drowning in
flood of political money); Anderson, supra note 59, at 84 (increasing funds have "served to
make a mockery of the idea of one man, one vote"); see also Wright, supra note 17, at 609
(1982) (stating demise of ideal of equality).
62 See Anderson, supra note 59, at 82 (noting general acceptance that 1992 to 1996
yielded "explosion" in campaign spending); Eric Pianin, Money Machine: The Fund Rais-
ing Frenzy of Campaign '96: How Business Found Benefits in Wage Bill, WASH. POST.,
Feb. 11, 1997 at A8 (noting spending by corporate PACs doubled).
63 See Anderson, supra note 59, at 82 (referring to Washington Post article by Miller
and Sifry); Ellen S. Miller & Micah Sifry, Move Over Big Money, WASH. POST, April 7,
1997 at A17 (showing recent statistics).
64 See Simon, supra note 5, at 176 (detailing expanding soft money coffers); Karen
Gullo, Once Illegal 'Soft Money' Taints Political Climate 'Soft' Contributions Again Rais-
ing Queries on Curbing Big Money, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 12, 1997, at 14A (showing
increasing amounts of soft money).
65 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (comparing soft money to floodwaters).
66 See Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Com-
mittee, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) ('The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro
quo: dollars for political favors."); Schultz, supra note 5, at 45 (arguing quid pro quo rela-
tionship surrounding contributions undermines integrity of system of representative de-
mocracy); Neuborne, supra note 29, at 7 ('At a minimum, we mean the quid pro ar-
rangement that exists when a donor gives money in return for a promise that an official
will perform official duties in a particular way.").
67 See Neuborne, supra note 42, at 111-12 (contending that in post-Buckley world ac-
cess to public officials is for sale). See generally Panel Discussion, Revolutionizing Cam-
paign Finance- An Appraisal of Proposed Reforms, 13 J.L. & POLITICS 163 (1997).
68 See Simon, supra note 5, at 177; see also William C. Rempel & Alan C. Miller, First
Lady's Aide Solicited Check to DNC, Donor Says Fund-Raising: Administration Denies
Account by Torrance Businessman Johnny Chung Who Gave $50,000 Contribution to Hil-
lary Clinton's Chief of Staff, L.A_ TIMES, July 27, 1997, at Al (commenting on ties between
political access and money).
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There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence indicating
that the effect of campaign contributions is to sway mem-
bers of Congress to support positions that are not necessar-
ily in the best interests of their constituencies. 69 This buy
and sell relationship has led to widespread corruption
among both major political parties.70 This corruption was
vividly depicted during the 1995-1996 election cycle, when
the two parties raised over $262 million in soft money 7'
from unregulated sources, raised with the assistance of both
Presidential candidates.72 The candidates helped their par-
ties raise funds under the pretense of issue advocacy, when
in fact it was "electioneering", seeking to advocate their in-
dividual positions.73 This pervasive deception resulted in
widespread violations of the election laws.74 This was seen
in the scandals involving the Asian investors who bought
stays in the Lincoln bedroom and attendance at White
House coffees. 75
69 See Anderson, supra note 59, at 88 (referring to experiences of former Representa-
tive Dan Hamburg of California and other unnamed representatives); Dan Hamburg, In-
side the Money Chase, NATION, May 5, 1997, at 25 (describing personal account of cause
and effect relationship between contributions and legislative process); Carl Bernstein, The
Nation Campaign Finance Draining a Swamp: Take Money Out of Politics, L.A. TIMES,
July 20, 1997, at M2 (quoting lobbyists Wayne Thevenot: "They [members of Congress]
have become full-time fund-raisers and part-time representatives, whose actions reflect
who gives them money and how much."); Wright, supra note 17 at 618-19 (discussing ef-
fect on Representatives' voting of political contributions).
70 See Simon, supra note 5, at 177 (discussing actions of DNC during 1996 campaign);
see also Smith, supra note 5, at 32 (examining issue advocacy ads used by both parties).
71 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (noting both parties raised more than $263
million in soft money, an increase of more than three times that of 1991-92 presidential
election cycle).
72 See Waking Up the FEC, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A14 (discussing amount of
soft money personally raised by both Clinton and Dole campaigns in 1996); Don Van
Natta, Jr. & Jane Fritsch, $250,000 Buys the Best Access to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1997, at Al (reporting that in January 1996, Republican National Committee offered pri-
vate receptions with Republican congressional and presidential candidates in exchange
for $250,000 donations).
73 See Simon, supra note 5, at 174 (stating that in 1996, "[tlhere was a flood of so-
called issue advocacy that was plainly electioneering").
74 See Van Natta, Jr. & Fritsch supra note 72, at Al; Neuborne, supra note 34, at 795
(describing actions of Democrats (Lincoln bedroom) and Republicans (openly selling access
to their candidate for $100,000 contribution) during 1996 election).
75 See Defiant Clinton Shows No Remorse Over His Fund-Raising Methods, CHI.
TRIB., May 2, 1997, at 12 (referring to Democrats' fundraising techniques); Stephen Laba-
ton, A Clinton Social With Bankers Included A Leading Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1997, at 1 (discussing White House coffees, where large Democratic donors met with high
ranking regulatory officials); see also David Willman et al., An Investigative Report: What
Clinton Knew; How a Push for New Fund-Raising Led to Foreign Access, Bad Money and
Questionable Ties, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1997, at Al (describing Asian contributions to
Democratic party in 1996). See generally Frank J. Schuchat, Foreign Investment in the
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B. Incumbency: Entrenchment of the Status Quo
The constant focus on campaign financing has led to a
public perception that politicians engage in a perpetual
money chase. 76 This has engendered increasing public cyni-
cism towards politics, 77 which manifests itself in voter apa-
thy.7 8 This apathy was evident in the lack of voter turnout
in 1996, where only 48% of registered voters came to the
polls, the lowest voter turnout in five decades. 79 Such low
turnout is a sign of public alienation from the political proc-
ess.80
The survival of a democracy depends upon the availability
of electoral choices for the public.8 1 However, the current
campaign finance system provides incumbents with such an
enormous fundraising edge over challengers that voters are
deprived of choices. 82 Since 1974, campaign costs have sky-
United States, 32 INT'L LAW 287, 288 (1998) (describing FECA's prohibition on foreign
contributions).
76 See Simon, supra note 5, at 174 (discussing public attitude of general cynicism to-
wards politics); see also Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51 at 1133 (describing money
chase as permanent part of politician's life); Blasi, supra note 28, at 1304 (describing fail-
ure of representation due to excessive fundraising).
77 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1127 ('The extraordinary public cyni-
cism we see today profoundly threatens our democracy"); Neuborne, supra note 42, at 17
('To the extent officials are perceived as acting under the undue influence of large concen-
trations of wealth, many voters lose faith in the process.").
78 See Simon, supra note 5, at 174 (commenting on widespread public disaffection
from political process); see also Neuborne, supra note 42, at 17 (noting that low voter
turnout).
79 See Simon, supra note 5, at 174 (stating that statistics on voter turnout); Neub-
orne, supra note 42, at 112 (stating that only 48.8% of eligible electorate voted in 1996
Presidential campaign); Fred Kindecke, 'A Done Deal'.- Clinton's Wide Lead Kept Voter
Turnout Low, ST. LouIs POST, Nov. 7, 1996, at 17a (discussing voter turnout in 1996 elec-
tion); see also Barbara Vobejda, Just Under Half of Possible Voters Went to the Polls,
WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1996, at A30 (discussing recent trends of low voter turnout). See gen-
erally Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character
of American Labor Laws" WIS. L. REV. 1, 51-53 (1990) (comparing declining American
voting trends to increasing European voting patterns).
80 See Simon, supra note 5, at 174 (discussing public flight from political process);
Neuborne, supra note 42, at 113 (stating that Americans feel "left out" of political proc-
ess); see also David Cay Johnston, Voting, America's Not Keen on, Coffee is Another Mat-
ter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, at 2 (explaining that Americans do not vote because they
feel it is futile).
81 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 794 (stating existence of Democratic crisis); see
also Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1127 (stating that "[d]emocracy depends for
its survival on having real elections with real choices if the people are truly to have the
power to elect representatives that can be held accountable").
82 See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in 'Faulty Assumptions": A Re-
sponse to Professor Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867,
892 (1998) (noting that incredible advantages incumbents have against challengers in
fundraising capacities); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1133 (discussing fund-
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rocketed, placing political office out of the reach of most
challengers. 83 Spending in Senate races has increased from
a total of $38.1 million in the 1976 cycle, to $210.8 million
in the 1992 elections.8 4 Similarly, spending in House races
has increased from $60.9 million in 1976, to $326.9 million
in 1992.85 While admittedly costs have increased, challeng-
ers' access to money has decreased.8 6 In 1996, House in-
cumbents raised $282 million in campaign funds, compared
to $75 million by their challengers. 87 Incumbent senators
raised more than twice as much money as their challeng-
ers.88
This contrast in campaign earnings has resulted in a
stagnation of the political process because campaign funds
translate into electability.89 Candidates who raise and
spend the most money are generally elected to office. 90 In-
raising gap that exists between incumbents and challengers); see also 137 Cong. Rec. §
5876 (daily ed. May 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Boren) (contending incumbents have
great advantage over challengers). See generally Smith, supra note 23, at 1073-74 (de-
scribing advantages of incumbency).
83 See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1293 (discussing obstacles deterring challengers);
Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1132-35 (discussing costs of running election); see
also Edwin Chen, Local-Level Suits Keep Campaign Reform Alive, , L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20,
1997, at Al (stating that "[i]f you can't raise $200,000, you can't be a senator.").
84 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1132 (providing Senate election
spending statistics and citing 1992 Senate Campaign Financing, Press Release, Common
Cause Washington, D.C. (Spring 1993)); Fed. Election Comm'n, FEC Disclosure Series No.
6:1976 Senatorial Campaign Receipts and Expenditures 3 (1977) (providing Senate elec-
tion expenditures).
85 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1132 (providing House election
spending statistics and citing 1992 House Campaign Financing, Press Release, Common
Cause, Washington D.C. (Spring 1993)).
86 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1133 (discussing limited fundraising
abilities of challenger).
87 See Financing of Campaign '96: One More Cause For Reform Once Again the Cur-
rent System's Injustice is Made Obvious, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at B8 (providing
funding statistics); see also Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1133-34 (stating that
in 1992, House incumbents outspent their challengers on average by 4 to 1).
88 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1133-34 (stating that in 1992 average
senate incumbent spent almost $4.2 million on their campaign, average challenger only
spent $1.7 million).
89 See Marty Jezer et al., A Proposal for Democratically Financed Congressional Elec-
tions, 11 YALE L. & POLY REV. 333, 338-39 (1993) (discussing importance of money to
election process); Burke, supra note 1, at 376 (discussing ties between funding and elects-
bility); see also Wright, supra note 17, at 622 (providing statistical data to illustrate cor-
relation between campaign spending and winning).
90 See Jezer et al., supra note 89, at 338 (stating that "the candidates who raise and
spend the most money continue to be elected to political office"); see also Burke, supra
note 1 at 376 (stating that "[ilnevitably, those candidates who raise and spend the most
money are those who are elected to office"). See, e.g., Wright, supra note 17, at 622 (illus-
trating correlation between funds and electability).
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cumbents have consistently raised more than their chal-
lengers and since 1974, have been re-elected with a corre-
sponding consistency: the Senate- 85%, the House- 89%.91
Recent elections continue this trend. Approximately 95% of
Congressional incumbents won their elections in 1996.92 In
1992, 279 of the 349 House incumbents ran unopposed, ran
opposed by challengers who raised less than $25,000, or ran
noncompetitive races against challengers who raised less
than half of the amount that incumbents raised.9 3 Of these
incumbents, 98% won.94 In the 1990 House elections, 91% of
House incumbents were unopposed, financially unopposed,
or in noncompetitive races.95 Of these, incumbents won 99%
of the races. 96
These results are mirrored in the Senate. In 1992, Senate
incumbents outspent their challengers in 27 out of 28 races,
and only four lost. 97 In 1990, Senate incumbents outspent
91 See Neuborne, supra note 42, at 113 (stating that "h]istorically the incumbent re-
election rate hovers in the mid to upper nineties"); Burke, supra note 1, at 376 (discussing
ties between incumbency and reelection); Blasi, supra note 28, at 1294 (stating that elec-
toral playing field is tilted to benefit of incumbents); see also Jezer et al., supra note 89,
at 339 (discussing benefits of incumbency); Raskin & Bonifaz, supra note 42, at 293 (fo-
cusing on reelection statistics); L. SANDY MAISEL, THE INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE IN
MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY 119, 121 (Margaret Latus Nugent & John R. Jo-
hannes eds., 1990).
92 See Ceci Connolly & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Grip on House Hinges on Close Races;
Democrats Buoyed as Incumbents Fall, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1998, at A27 (analyzing in-
cumbent reelection rates and finding "that virtually all lawmakers seeking another term
will get it"); Financing of Campaign '96: One More Cause for Reform Once Again the Cur-
rent System's Injustice is Made Obvious, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at B8 (noting that in-
cumbent reelection rate).
93 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1134 (discussing competitiveness of
1992 House races in terms of economics); see also 1992 House Campaign Financing, Press
Release, Common Cause, Washington D.C. (Spring 1993) (analyzing incumbent fund-
raising). See generally Janet Hook, Wealth of Uncontested House Races Reflects Parties'
Strategies With GOP in Slight Majority, Democrats, Republicans, Focus Mostly on Com-
petitive Districts , L.A. TIMES, June 29, 1998, at A5 (discussing competitiveness of 1998
House races).
94 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1134 (discussing incumbents' reelec-
tion); see also Connolly & Eilperin, supra note 92, at A27 (noting incumbent reelection
rates); 1992 House Campaign Financing Press Release, Common Cause, Washington D.C.
(Spring 1993) (providing incumbents' reelection statistics).
95 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51 at 1135 (discussing 1990 House races fi-
nancially); Home Field Advantage, COMMON CAUSE NEWS (Common Cause, Washington
D.C.), Mar. 26, 1992, at 34 (discussing 1990 House races).
96 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51 at 1135 (discussing incumbents' reelec-
tion); Home Field Advantage, COMMON CAUSE NEWS (Common Cause, Washington D.C.),
Mar. 26, 1992, at 34 (providing incumbents' reelection statistics).
97 See Cornelius P. McCarthy, Campaign Finance: A Challenger's Perspective on
Funding and Reform, 6 J.L. & POLY 69, 71 (1997) (noting that 1998 saw 98% re-election
rate among House incumbents); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1135 (discussing
1999]
170 ST JOHNS JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 14:155
their challengers in 26 out of 28 races, and only one Senate
incumbent lost to a challenger. 98 Thus, there is a clear tie
between finance and electability.99 This connection, coupled
with the tremendous fundraising power wielded by incum-
bents, has disenfranchised the American public by effec-
tively denying them any possibility of change and en-
trenching the status quo.100
C. Special interests
1. Political Action Committees
Incumbents' financial advantages stem largely from po-
litical action committees (PACs).101 PACs are created to ex-
ert political influence on the basis of financial contribu-
tions.10 2 Since 1974, the influence of PACs has substantially
increased and they now constitute almost 50% of the con-
competitiveness of 1992 Senate races in terms of economics); 1992 House Campaign Fi-
nancing, Press Release, Common Cause, Wash. D.C. (Spring 1993) (discussing competi-
tion in 1992 Senate race).
98 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1135 (discussing 1990 Senate races
from financial perspective); see also Nearly Half of Senate Incumbents Seeking Election in
1990 Were Unopposed or Financially Unopposed, COMMON CAUSE NEWS (Common Cause,
Washington D.C.), Feb. 28, 1991, at app. III.
99 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1133-34 (quoting Senator David Boren:
"When we see the influence of money itself on the system, and we realize that more and
more people are being elected not on the basis of their qualifications .... but based upon
which one can raise the most money, we know that something is wrong .... ); Jezer &
Miller, supra note 25, at 474 (stating that empirical evidence indicates money determines
which candidates are likely to win political office); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Sympo-
sium- the Constitutional Imperative and Practical Superiority of Democratically Financed
Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1177 (1994) (stating that election results indicate that
money is decisive factor).
100 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 794 (discussing public's limited choice of candi-
dates); Neuborne, supra note 42, at 114 (1997) (stating that current system favors status
quo); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1133 (discussing entrenchment of status
quo). See generally Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1401 (providing tabular information of in-
cumbency and reelection).
101 See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Faulty Assumptions in 'Faulty Assumptions" A Re-
sponse to Professor Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN. L. REV. 867,
874 (1998) (analyzing PACs preference for contributing to incumbents' campaigns); Law-
rence Schlam, Legislative Term Limitation Under a "Limited" Popular Initiative Provi-
sion?, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1993) (stating that PACs overwhelmingly support in-
cumbents); Kimberly Coursen et. al., Restoring Faith in Congress, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 249, 270 (1993) (stating that incumbents monopolize PAC contributions); Stein, su-
pra note 4, at 747 (noting PAC contributors favor incumbents).
102 See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1396 (discussing use and creation of PACs); Tho-
mas Stratmann, The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Every-
thing?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 85, 96 (illustrating that PACs attempt to influence political votes
via contributions).
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tributions to Congressional election coffers.103 PAC contri-
butions are overwhelmingly made to incumbents. 0 4 In
1992, House incumbents received $91.4 million from PACs,
whereas, challengers received a $8.7 million-a 10.5 to 1
advantage. 0 5 Senate incumbents raised more than $38
million from PACs, six times as much as their challeng-
ers. 0 6 PACs overwhelmingly support incumbents because
their self-professed purpose is to secure access and influ-
ence with elected officials. 107
PACs tend to use one of two strategies to achieve their
goals--either the "electoral" strategy or the "legislative"
strategy. 10 8 Under the electoral strategy, PACs contribute
to candidates who are likely to pursue policies that are fa-
vorable to the contributors.109 Under the legislative strat-
egy, they make contributions to the candidate that they
think is most likely to win.110 Under either approach, the
103 See Burke, supra note 1, at 376 (focusing on magnitude of PAC contributions to
elections); see also Jezer et al., supra note 89, at 336-40 (demonstrating importance of
PAC contributions to candidates); George S. Mitrovich, Public Funding of Elections:
Money and the Politics of Betrayal, 57 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 435, 436 (May 1,
1991).
104 See Burke, supra note 1, at 376-77 (stating that incumbents usually receive PAC
contributions); Mitch McConell, Campaign Finance Reform: A Senator's Perspective, 8 J.L.
POL'Y 333, 336 (1992) (discussing PAC contributions); Wright, supra note 17, at 615
(stating that PACs are more likely to donate money to incumbents).
105 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1135 (discussing fundraising advan-
tage of House incumbent); see also 1992 House Campaign Financing, Press Release,
Common Cause, Washington D.C. (Spring 1993).
106 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1136 (discussing fundraising advan-
tage of Senate incumbent); see also Senate Campaign Financing, Press Release, Common
Cause, Washington D.C. (Spring 1993).
107 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1138-39 (stating that "PAC officials
also have acknowledged their preference for incumbents"); Sunstein, supra note 28, at
1409 (stating that PAC contributions are often given with intention of influencing law-
makers); see also Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869, 903 (1988)
(stating that "Political Action Committee's are simply vehicles that permit individuals to
pool their spending in order to advance their political views").
108 See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intracta-
ble Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1273 (1994) (stating that donation strategy cho-
sen has serious consequences); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform:
The Root of all Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOF. L. REV. 301, 308 (1989) (discussing donation
strategies of interest groups).
109 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, A Patternless Mosaic: Campaign Finance and the
First Amendment After Austin, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 381, 427 n. 35 (1992) (distinguishing
ideological PACs, which rely on electoral strategies); Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1409
(discussing electoral strategy).
110 See Smith, supra note 23, at 1075 (discussing concerns related to legislative strat-
egy); Lowenstein, supra note 108, at 308 (discussing legislative strategy); see also BeVier,
supra note 108, at 1273 (reflecting on contributions made on basis of future electability);
Wright, supra note 17, at 615 (discussing donation strategy of PACs).
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association has nefarious implications.I' PACs destroy the
ties between a representative and the republic's citizens,
and instead make the representative accountable to their
financial constituents.112 At the very least this makes rep-
resentatives ineffective, because the divergent agendas of
the interest groups cancel each other out and further en-
trench the existing system. 113 At worst, politicians abdicate
their power to the "moneyed elite" who dictate the nation's
policy."l 4 At both ends of the spectrum the average citizen
is the victim of this "representative" system.115
2. Corporations
Corporate donations have long been banned.116 However,
111 See Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of
Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing Congressional awareness of catering to
contributing constituencies). See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1396 (discussing dan-
gers of PACs). But see Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (arguing that PACs pose no danger to politi-
cal process).
112 See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1305 (arguing that representatives should have incen-
tive to serve all their constituents well); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1126-27
(quoting John Gardner's speech: "Hold power accountable. That means, among other
things, that we can no longer tolerate a system of campaign financing that makes our
leaders accountable to donors rather than voters, that makes it possible for money to buy
political outcomes, to buy politicians."); The Road to Anarchy- Excessive Campaign Spend-
ing, Statement of Sen. Barry Goldwater Before the Commission on National Elections,
Sept. 17, 1985, at 6. The fact that liberty depended on honest elections was of the utmost
importance to the patriots who founded our nation and wrote the Constitution. They knew
that corruption destroyed the prime requisite of constitutional liberty, an independent
legislature free from any influence other than that of the people. Applying these princi-
ples to modern times, we can make the following conclusions. To be successful, represen-
tative government assumes that elections will be controlled by the citizenry at large, not
by those who give the most money. Electors must believe their vote counts. Elected offi-
cials must owe their allegiance to the people, not to their own wealth or to the wealth of
interest groups who speak only for the selfish fringes of the whole community. Id.
113 See Blasi, supra note 28, at 1305 (making politicians accountable to numerous
special interest groups does not increase their effectiveness); see also David A. Strauss,
Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1375-80(1994) (discussing political effectiveness); Wright, supra note 17, 614-620 (comparing
PACs to "a form of legalized bribery").
114 See Russell D. Feingold, Special Interests and Soft Money, 10 STAN. L. & POLy
REV. 59, 60-61 (1998) (describing political parties as water carriers for wealthy); Richard
L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: an Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996) (stating that wealthy individu-
als enjoy disproportionate influence).
115 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 382 (concluding that representative democracy be-
comes a corporate democracy where donations determine representation); Wertheimer &
Manes, supra note 51, at 1129 (stating that interest groups dictate policy).
116 See 2 U.S.C. § 441 b (a) (1996) (stating that it is illegal for corporations to make
contributions to electoral campaigns of candidates); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (citing Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 500-01); Hill, supra note 49 at
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the development of soft money has provided corporate
America with a direct inlet to politics. 11 7 A study of the
country's largest companies showed that corporate dona-
tions rose 75% from 1993 to 1997.118 Also, the overall num-
ber of corporations donating has increased, from 366 in
1992 to 403 in 1996.119
It is interesting to note that the largest corporate con-
tributors are the corporations that have become the focus of
federal investigations, that are highly regulated by the gov-
ernment, or are highly dependent on it for subsidies.120
Successful corporations such as Intel and Merck, which are
not dependent on government aid, are not comparatively
large corporate contributors. 121 On the other hand, corpora-
tions such as Philip Morris and Archer-Daniels-Midland
rank high on the corporate contributor list.122 Philip Morris
899-900 (detailing prohibition on corporate donations). See generally Robert Kutner, The
Other Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1998, at C7 (stating that "with unlimited private
donations, rich individuals and corporations have more influence than ordinary voters-
and politics becomes an oligarchy").
117 See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 7, at 867 (explaining donations are often given by
unions and corporations attempting to avoid statutory rules); Hill, supra note 49, at 899
(discussing corporate ability to make unlimited soft money contributions); Ralph Vartabe-
dian, Big Business, Big Bucks, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1997, at B7 (discussing influence of
global companies over electoral politics).
118 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7(discussing corporate donations); Corpora-
tions, Not Citizens, Dominate Political Giving, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1996, at 3 (detailing
corporate donations); see also Todd J. Gillmanm, Fortunately for Dallas, Art Transcends
Partisanship, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 2, 1999, at 24A (noting number of corpo-
rations giving $100,000 or more increased 62% over past four years). See generally, Char-
les Lewis, Capital Gains on Capitol Hill, Special Interests use Campaign Contributions to
Purchase Influence in Congress, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 25, 1998, at 1J.
119 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7 (discussing increasing number of corpora-
tions donating).
120 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7(discussing status of corporations contrib-
uting); Wright, supra note 17, at 616 (stating that largest contributions from corporate
PACs are from more highly regulated industries). See generally Ann McBride, End Corpo-
rate Welfare, IDAHO STATESMAN, July 23, 1998, at 9A.
121 See Thomas Sowell, Blame Big Government, Not Big Business, CHIC. SUN-TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1997, at 23 (stating that Intel ranks low on list of corporate contributors); Thomas
Sowell, Bribes or Protection Money, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 3, 1997, at 15 (stating that Intel is
comparatively small corporate donor); Ralph Vartabedian, Top Corporations aren't Top
Political Donors, Analysis Finds, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28, 1997, at 10A
(stating Intel and Merck rank far down list of corporate contributions to political cam-
paigns); Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7 (stating that Intel is 45th largest company,
but 307th largest contributor; Merck & Co. is 50 th largest corp. and it is 129th largest con-
tributor).
122 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7 (listing financial importance of various
contributors); Charles R. Babcock, Parties Raised Nearly $60 Million in 'Soft' Money 1995
Donations, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1996, at A17 (listing corporate contributors); Fuel Sub-
sidy Unfair to Competitors, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, June 17, 1997, at
08A (stating that Archer-Daniels-Midland is large contributor to political parties).
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was the largest contributor at $3.9 million, 123 the company
has also long been under attack for its cigarette marketing
and manufacturing practices. 124 Similarly, Archer-Daniels-
Midland, which is perceived to be at the bottom of the agri-
business industry, is the largest recipient of federal tax
credits for ethanol production.125 Corporate contributors
candidly admit that they seek access to the nation's leaders,
and use contributions to achieve this purpose. 126 Thus, not
only is unfair access being provided, but it is being provided
to the nation's most controversial organizations. 127
III. PROPOSALS
There have been various attempts to reform the current
ailing system and limit the flow of soft money.128 The pri-
mary impediment to such reform seems to be the judicially
created tie between political contributions and free
123 See Phillip Morris Donates 4.2 million, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 3, 1997, at 4
(stating that biggest contributor to political campaigns in 1995-96 was Phillip Morris);
Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7; Party Favors: An Analysis of More than $67 Million
in Soft Money Given to Democratic and Republican National Party Committees in 1997,
Common Cause (Feb. 1997) (analyzing contributions of tobacco companies); see also Lie-
berman, supra note 5, at 443 (stating that tobacco companies in general gave nearly $6
million to Republican party and almost $1 million to Democratic party).
124 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7 (discussing political climate surrounding
Philip Morris); see also Charles Lewis, Capital Gains on Capital Hill, Special Interests
Use Campaign Contributions to Purchase Influence in Congress, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 25, 1998, at 1J (noting that Congress has bestowed a kind of "most favored industry"
status on tobacco companies).
125 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7 (discussing status of Archer-Daniels-
Midland); see also Steven Mufson, Andreas Steps Down, ADM Chief Took Politics to a New
Level, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1999, at E1 (stating that ADM has "been the most prominent
recipient of corporate welfare in recent U.S. history); ADM to Keep Ethanol Break,
Gingrich Forecasts No Repeal, CHIC. TRIB., June 4, 1997, at 5 (stating that subsidy for
ethanol production primarily benefits Archer-Daniels-Midland). See generally Ann
McBride, End Corporate Welfare, IDAHO STATESMAN, July 23, 1998, at 9A.
126 See Ralph Vartabedian, Where Big Donors Treat, Big Favors Seem to Follow Poli-
tics, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at Al (quoting corporate PAC vice-president as saying
"[tlhe influence of corporations on public policy is growing"); Vartabedian, supra note 117,
at B7 (quoting corporate PAC directors as saying contributions provide access);.
127 See Vartabedian, supra note 117, at B7 (finding that corporations with strong po-
litical interests are more likely to contribute); E. Joshua Rosenkrantz, ' Faulty Assump-
tions" A Response to Professor Smith's Critiques of Campaign Finance Reform, 30 CONN.
L. REV. 867, 872 (1998) (stating that reformers see officeholders as favoring those who
have bankrolled their campaigns).
128 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 810 (discussing difficulties facing reformers); Jer-
emy Paul, Campaign Reform for the 21, 1 Century: Putting Mouth Where the Money Is, 30
CONN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998) (explaining reform proposals); Michael J. Sandel, Votes for
Sale, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 1996, at 25 (discussing reform attempts).
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speech.129 Contrary to popular belief, however, this tie is
not as strong as politicians would have us believe. 130 The
First Amendment does not allow the moneyed classes to use
their wealth to subjugate the remainder of society.131 A let-
ter from the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York
University School of Law, signed by 126 constitutional
scholars, stated that banning soft money was actually in
line with existing federal regulations.132 Thus, attempts to
correct the system should not be thwarted by constitutional
concerns. 133 Among the more recent proposals for change is
the McCain-Feingold bill.134 This bill has had a long and
129 See Schultz, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing Buckley); see also Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 688 (1997) (stat-
ing that "[w]ithout altering conventional free speech norms about informal political dis-
course, there are outer limits on the ability of any reform to limit these substitution
efforts").
130 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 796 (discussing weaknesses in link between
speech and money); see also Schultz, supra note 5, at 50-51 (noting that tie between
speech and money is not absolute); Neuborne, supra note 42, at 115 (stating that linkage
of money and speech suffers from fallacy of fungibility).
131 See Frank Askin, Political Money and Freedom of Speech: Kathleen Sullivan's
Seven Deadly Sins- an Antitoxin, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1065, 1078 (1998) (discussing
First Amendment in terms of contributions); Kathleen Sullivan, Political Money and
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 687 (discussing First Amendment and
campaign contributions); see also Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: Why the
Constitution Should Contain this Principle, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1204, 1206 (1994) (dis-
cussing equality and elections).
132 See Feingold, supra note 44 (supporting ban on soft money); Letter from the
Brennan Center for Justice to John McCain and Russell Feingold, Senators, United States
Senate (Sept. 22, 1997) reprinted in 143 Cong. Rec. at § 10103 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1997):
Soft money has become an end run around the campaign contribution limits, creating
a corrupt system in which monied interests appear to buy access to, and inappropri-
ate influence with, elected officials... The soft money loophole has raised the specter
of corruption stemming from large contributions (and those from prohibited sources)
that led Congress to enact the federal contribution limits in the first place....
[Closing the loophole for soft money contributions is in line with the longstanding
and constitutional ban on corporate and union contributions in federal elections and
with limits on the size of individuals' contributions to amounts that are not corrupt-
ing.
Id.
133 See Neuborne, supra note 34, at 811 (discussing "the angle of repose" favoring re-
form); Stein, supra note 4, at 748 (stating that "coexistence between the First Amendment
and effective campaign-finance reform is constitutionally permissible"); see also Owen M.
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1425 (1986) (critiquing con-
temporary First Amendment theory and arguing that some limitations are necessary to
ensure freedom).
134 The McCain-Feingold bill was sponsored by Senator Russell D. Feingold of Wis-
consin (Democrat), and Senator John McCain of Arizona (Republican). See Helen Dewar,
Campaign Finance Resurfacing in Senate; Reform Advocates are Newly Hopeful of Win-
ning GOP Support, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1998, at A21; Mary McGrory, Campaigning for
Reform, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1997, at A2.
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difficult history.135 Its primary goal is a complete ban on
soft money. 136 This includes prohibiting federal officehold-
ers and candidates for federal office from soliciting, receiv-
ing, or spending soft money. 137 The bill also includes re-
strictions on issue advertisements by outside groups as well
as provisions to improve FEC disclosure and enforce-
ment.138 Although the bill seemingly has majority support
in the Senate, it has not been able to overcome repeated
dilatory tactics. 139 A similar proposal, the Shays-Meehan
bill, has obtained House approval.140 The Shays-Meehan
bill would ban soft money donations to political parties.141
It would also impose restrictions on issue advocacy adver-
tising.142 Passage of the Shays-Meehan bill led many to be-
lieve that campaign finance reform had finally overcome
135 The bill was first introduced in September 1995, but was amended and reconsid-
ered by the Senate in June 1996. See Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1996, S.
1219, 104th Cong. (1996). It was then reintroduced on January 21, 1997. See Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 493, 105th Cong. §25 (1997). A modified version was
introduced on September 18, 1997. See S. 1191, 105' Cong. (1997). However, the bill has
not been able to overcome a filibuster. New efforts have continued. See, e.g., H.R. 417,
106th Cong (1999); S. 504 1060, Cong. (1999), H.R. 32, 106t Cong. (1999).
136 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 383 (describing centerpiece of bill as being ban on
soft money).
137 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 383 (stating that federal officials would be prohib-
ited from soliciting donations).
138 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 383 (discussing improved disclosure provisions);
Claudia Deane & Ruth Marcus, Politics, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1998, at A12 (stating that
bill enhances disclosure requirements); Helen Dewar, Latest Campaign Finance Debate
Opens; Threat of Senate GOP Filibuster Against Overhaul Remains Strong, WASH. POST,
Feb. 24, 1998, at A4 (noting that bill requires increased disclosure).
139 See Kathy Sawyer, Sen. McConnell Criticizes Campaign Finance Bill; Republican
Says Free Speech Would Be Violated, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1999, at A4 (noting that bill
has faced "flurry of filibusters"); Helen Dewar, Campaign Financing Resurfacing in Sen-
ate; Reform Advocates are Newly Hopeful of Winning GOP Support, WASH. POST, Feb. 20,
1998, at A21 (noting "dueling filibusters"); Feingold, supra note 44, at 386 (discussing re-
peated threat of filibusters).
140 See A Victory for Shays-Meehan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1998, at Al (stating that
House passed Shays-Meehan bill); A Triumph for Campaign Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1998, at Al (noting passage of bill in House, 237 to 186); see also Smith, supra note 4, at
31-34 (analyzing Shays-Meehan proposal).
141 See H.R. 417, 106th Cong. §101 (1999) (amending section 323 of 1971 FECA); see
also Helen Dewar, House Approves a Bill for Campaign Finance: Overhaul Plans Vie to
Face Senate Fight, WASH. POST, August 4, 1998, at A2. See generally Allison Mitchell,
GOP Leaders in House Rebuffed on Election Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, at A6
(noting that ban was fiercely opposed by Republicans).
142 See H.R. 417, 106th Cong. §308 (1999) (limiting campaign advertising); Dewar, su-
pra note 141, at A2 (noting bill would limit issue advocacy advertising); see also Brent A.
Fewell, Awash in Soft Money and Political Corruption: The Need for Campaign Finance
Reform, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 107, 126 (1997) (describing issue advertising as strategy used by
candidates to avoid statutory prohibitions on campaign contributions).
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partisan politics.143 However, Senate refusal to pass the bill
eviscerated any such hope. 144
IV. SOLUTION
Congress should eliminate the partisan nature of cam-
paign finance reform and initiate a complete ban on soft
money. 145 This would eliminate the various corrupting in-
fluences that exist in electioneering.146 Hard money, which
is raised in accordance with existing financing regulations,
should be the sole source of funding for elections.147 This
solution would create a bright-line test, eliminating any
confusion or inaccuracy in the current system.148 The cur-
rent difficulty inheres in the hard-soft dichotomy.149 Pres-
ently large amounts of unregulated money find their way
into campaigns.150 Parties, while claiming to focus on party-
building activities, are actually using the funds to further
143 See Dewar, supra note 141, at A2 (quoting Senator McCain as saying he thought
House approval "might change some votes in the Senate").
144 See Feingold, supra note 44 (discussing Senate's failure to pass bill); David Sara-
sohn, Politicians Behave Like Panhandlers, STAR-LEDGER, Newark, Feb. 10, 1999, at 17(noting filibuster prevented passage and that fight does not look "any easier" this year).
145 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 386; Corrado, supra note 46, at 54 (eliminating soft
money). See, e.g., Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1149 (referring to divisive na-
ture of Federal Election Commission).
146 See Schultz, supra note 5, at 45 (discussing quid pro quo relationship surrounding
campaign contributions); Neuborne, supra note 29, at 7 (noting dangers of quid pro quo in
campaign finance).
147 See Russell Feingold, Special Interests and Soft Money, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
59, 60 (1998) (arguing that soft money should be banned); Archibald Cox, The Case for
Campaign Finance Reform, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 289, 289-90 (1998) (arguing that soft money
should be limited); see also Simon, supra note 5, at 176 C'Mhe entire soft money system is
an edifice built on the foundation of a fallacy.").
148 See Lieberman, supra note 5, at 429-30 (noting complexities in current system);
Cox, supra note 147, at 289-90 (claiming that eliminating soft money would "make a huge
difference" to election laws); Joel M. Gora, Campaign Finance Reform: Still Searching
Today for a Better Way, 6 J.L. & POL'y 137, 153 (1997) (stating that unitary approach is
needed); see also Simon, supra note 5, at 176 (noting that hard/soft dichotomy has created
dual financing mechanisms).
149 See Adam Winkler, Beyond Bellotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 217-18 (1998) (not-
ing that corruptive dangers of unregulated soft money are similar to corruptive dangers of
regulated hard money); Donald J. Simon, Soft Money: the "End Run" Around Federal
Campaign Finance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 78 (1998) (arguing that soft money
is more dangerous because of its unregulated nature); Corrado, supra note 46, at 54
(stating that campaign laws should be clarified by eliminating hard/soft dichotomy).
150 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (noting that "the soft money channel, deeper
than a well and far wider than a church door, has allowed millions upon millions of dol-
lars that would have otherwise been barred by federal law to pour into our political sys-
tem").
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their candidates.l1l Regardless of the intention, soft money
adversely affects federal campaigns.152
Any effective solution to the current problem must comply
with the goal of campaign finance regulation, which ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, is the prevention of corrup-
tion.153 In this context, preventing corruption has at least
four meanings: (1) preventing all forms of quid pro quo rela-
tionships; (2) preventing unequal access to
representatives based on financial considerations; (3) in-
creasing a representative's ability to exercise independent
judgment on issues; (4) enhancing respect for the demo-
cratic process. 154 The fulfillment of these goals is crucial to
restoring faith in the social contract that underlies our po-
litical system.155 All citizens should support the electoral
process in a country with democratic political institutions,
because a lack of support undermines the validity of such a
system.156 To restore such support, an effective ban on soft
money should be enacted that includes three crucial compo-
nents: (1) national political parties should be prohibited
from soliciting or receiving any money that does not comply
151 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (discussing use of soft money by political par-
ties to fund advertising); Simon, supra note 5, at 176-77 (arguing that soft money is spent
to influence federal elections); Corrado, supra note 46, at 51 (discussing use of soft money
through issue advertising to affect federal elections).
152 See Feingold, supra note 44, at 380 (discussing federal implications of soft money);
Simon, supra note 5, at 176-77 (discussing soft money effects on federal elections); Cor-
rado, supra note 46, at 51 (discussing soft money dimensions of issue advocacy advertise-
ments). See generally, Donald J. Simon, Soft Money: the "End Run" Around Federal Cam-
paign Finance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 75, 78 (1998) (arguing that soft money
threats the integrity of the federal electoral process).
153 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (noting that preventing corruption and
appearance thereof preserves 'integrity' of democratic system); Simon, supra note 5, at
172 (discussing Court's reasoning); see also Sunstein, supra note 28 at 1394-5 (referring to
Court's view); Burke, supra note 1, at 365 (noting that Court's emphasis on preventing
appearance and actuality of corruption in Buckley).
154 See Neuborne, supra note 29, at 7-9 (demonstrating confusion surrounding cor-
ruption); Briffault, supra note 22, at 100-101 (stating complexities and dimensions of cor-
ruption); Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1128 (discussing corruption, and ap-
pearance of corruption).
155 See Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 51, at 1130 (stating that "when money and
privilege replace votes, the social contract underlying the political system is abrogated");
See also RICHARD C. HARWOOD ET AL., CITIZENS AND POLITICS: A VIEW FROM MAIN STREET
AMERICA, at V (1991) (documenting public perception that campaign contributions are
more likely to influence political outcomes than voting).
156 See Burke, supra note 1, at 379 (noting importance and significance of "clean elec-
tions"); Myles V. Lynk, Regulating Political Activity: Notes on a Hypothetical Statute to
Regulate Presidential Primary and General Election Campaigns, 8 J.L. & POLITICS 259,
266 (1992) (discussing proposals for clean elections).
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with federal law; (2) federal candidates and officeholders
should be prohibited from raising or soliciting any money
that does not comply with federal law; (3) state parties
should be bound by the current federal law.157
The concept of democracy presumes that all citizens have
equal access to the political sphere, yet the current system
discriminates against citizens that do not possess the
wealth to fund an effective campaign.158 This results in a
fragmentation of society where special interest groups can
eliminate the representation of various sectors and their
values, from political consideration. 59 Thus, the removal of
soft money, which is the very symbol of corruption in the
political system today, would seem to be the only solution to
the current deterioration.160
CONCLUSION
The task of campaign finance reform is filled with politi-
cal turmoil, public outrage, and a general feeling of frustra-
tion. However, the difficulty of the task does not absolve
the duty to perform it. The country has faced many politi-
cal scandals, from Watergate to those associated with the
Clinton presidency. These scandals have always caused
upheaval, but have resulted in positive change. There is
now an opportunity for Congress to continue in this tradi-
tion and slay the fundraising dragon that has been the
source of recent scandal. This would not just be a victory
for the political parties, but for the general public, who
would once again have a voice in the political system. As
Judge J. Skelly Wright wrote, "[w]e have failed to remind
157 See Campaign Finance Investigation, 1997; Hearing Before the Senate Govern-
mental Affairs Comm: 105th Cong (1997) 143 Cong. Rec. S2239-02, S2255 (containing let-
ter from President of Common Cause, Anne McBride, supporting ban on soft money);
Simon, supra note 5, at 178 (describing three dimensions of soft money that must be pro-
hibited for effective ban).
158 See Simon, supra note 5, at 177 (describing abandonment of ideals of equality);
Burke, supra note 1, at 381 (stating that current system magnifies special interest con-
cerns at expense of general populace).
159 See Burke, supra note 1, at 381 (noting lack of effective representation).
160 See Simon, supra note 5, at 178 (banning soft money is crucial to prevent corrosive
effect it is having upon public attitudes towards democracy); Panel Discussion: Revolu-
tionizing Campaign Finance- An Appraisal of Proposed Reforms, 13 J.L. & POL. 163, 174
(stating that key element to reform is elimination of soft money contributions).
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ourselves, as we moved from town halls to today's quadren-
nial Romanesque political extravagances, that politics is
neither an end in itself nor a means for subverting the wills
of the people."'161
Farrah Nawaz
161 See Wright, supra note 17, at 645 (describing evolution of American politics).
